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AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas was recently confronted
with a unique contract involving the dissolution of a partnership.'
The members of a partnership entered into a written agreement
providing that upon the death of either partner, persons named in
the instrument were to act as trustees in the "management, disposi-
tion, control, and settlement of all the affairs of the partnership."
By the agreement the partners did "grant, sell, and convey" unto
such trustees all property of the partnership. The instrument di-
rected that the trustees were to pay all debts and legal obligations
due by the partnership "at the time of the death of either of said
parners" and thereafter to deliver "one-half of the then remain-
ing trust estate to the surviving partner and one-half to the heirs
or legal representatives of the deceased partner."
In sustaining the validity of the trust agreement, the court cited
several earlier cases in which partners had made agreements as to
ownership and continued operation of the partnership after the
death of one partner. In the Gaut case2 two partners had agreed
that upon the death of either partner, title to all property was to
vest in the survivor; the survivor was to be indebted to repre-
sentatives of the deceased, as therein stipulated. The court said,
"That such an agreement, made bona fide, and for valuable con-
sideration, is valid and effectual, to transfer the title to the prop-
erty, is well settled."'
In the Alexander's Executors cases4 the partners entered into an
agreement providing that upon the death of either partner, the
surviving partner was to continue the partnership until the busi-
ness venture was concluded. The court quoted Justice Story for
the proposition "that it is competent for the partners to provide
I Smith v. Wayman, - Tex.-, 224 S. W. 2d. 211 (1949).
2 Gaut v. Reed Bros. & Co., 24 Tex. 46 (1859).
8 Id. at 54.
4 Alexander's Representatives v. Lewis, 47 Tex. 481 (1877); Lewis v. Alexander's
Executors, 34 Tex. 608 (1871) ; Kottwitz v. Alexander's Representatives, 34 Tex. 689
(1869).
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by agreement for the continuance of the partnership after death,"'
and sustained the validity of the agreement. The court recognized
the general rule that upon the death of a partner the partnership
is immediately terminated, but the court was of the opinion that
it is entirely competent for the parties to vary this general result
of law by an express agreement." 6
In the principal case the partners were attempting to relieve the
surviving partner of the burdensome job of properly disposing
of extensive and varied partnership interests. As the court pointed
out, a trust for such a purpose was novel. However, recognizing
that partnerships are based on contracts, the court properly sus-
tained the validity of the partnership agreement.7
Arkansas, Texas. During 1949 the Supreme Courts of Ar-
kansas and Texas each decided a case involving the liability of
an oil company for injuries resulting from negligence on the part
of employees of an agent. In Sinclair Refining Company v. Piles'
Sinclair and one Harris made an agreement under which the lat-
ter assumed charge of Sinclair's bulk sales station. The products
were to remain the property of Sinclair until sold. Harris was
required to take proper care of the equipment and to comply
with a financial remittance plan. The selling price of the products
was to be determined by Sinclair. Delivery trucks with Sinclair's
trade mark painted on them were to be furnished by Harris, who
was to employ (subject to Sinclair's approval) and to pay his
own truck drivers. Harris was to be responsible for, and to hold
Sinclair blameless for, any negligent acts of the drivers. Audas,
one of Harris' truck drivers, delivered to a retail store a quantity
of what was thought to be kerosene. Actually, the fuel contained
5 47 Tex. at 485, quoting from Burwell v. Mandeville's Executor, 2 How. 573, 567
(1844).
6 34 Tex. at 713.
7 The rights of the parties were determined on the basis that as the trustees were
given full power to represent the partnership in any necessary litigation, neither the
surviving partner nor the heirs of the deceased partner were necessary parties to a
suit to dissolve the trust and a subsequent hearing wherein receivers obtained a court
order to sell the partnership property.
8- Ark.- . 221 S. W. 2d. 12 (1949).
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15% gasoline. The plaintiff was injured by an explosion of some
of the mixture bought from the storekeeper and sued Sinclair for
damages. The defense was that Harris was an independent con-
tractor and Audas his servant, for whose acts Sinclair was not
responsible. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff the court con-
sidered not only the contract but also the acts and conduct of
the parties under the contract and found that such acts and
conduct would warrant an inference that Sinclair intended or con-
sented that Audas (as well as Harris) was to be its servant or
agent. The court concluded that it was the purpose of Sinclair to
retain complete control of all that was done in connection with
the sale and delivery of its kerosene, gasoline, and other products
and that the rule of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Johnson9 should
apply. The test is not whether the company actually directed the
delivery of the oil but whether it had the right to control delivery.
In the Texas case of Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin"0 a
customer left her car in the driveway of one of Humble's filling
stations to be serviced. Before doing so, she obtained permission
from an employee, who was then working on another car, to leave
her car there while she went for some groceries. Before any em-
ployee had touched the car, it rolled by gravity into the street and
injured plaintiffs, who sued Humble and the owner of the car.
Judgment for plaihtiffs against both defendants was affirmed (the
majority of the court also holding that Humble was entitled to
indemnity from the owner of the car). The same defense was made
as that interposed in Sinclair v. Piles. The contract between Hum.
ble and the operator of the filling station was known as a "Com-
mission Agency Agreement." Under it Humble rented the station
to the operator, the rental to be determined by the amount of
products sold. The operator was paid on a conunission basis
and had the general duties of running a service station, which
included operating under a system of strict financial control. He
also made reports and performed other duties required of him
9 149 Ark. 553. 233 S. W. 680 (1921).
10 - Tex.-, 222 S. W. 2d. 995 (1949).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
from time to time by the company. The fact that neither Humble,
the operator, nor the station employees considered Humble as
the employer or master and the fact that the contract expressly
repudiated any authority of Humble over the employees were
held not conclusive. There was other evidence bearing on the right
and power of Humble to control the details of the station work with
reference to the operator himself and with reference to his em-
ployees. It was expressly contemplated that the operator would
hire employees. The evidence was found to establish that the
operator was not an independent contractor but was in about the
same situation as a store clerk who happens to be paid a com-
mission instead of a salary. The case of The Texas Company v.
Wheat" was distinguished on the ground that it involved a dealer
type of relationship in which the lessee of the filling station
bought from the landlord, The Texas Company, and sold the prod-
ucts as his own, at his own price, and on his own terms.
In cases involving such contracts as those in the Sinclair and
Humble decisions the usual defense is the one relied on in those
cases. The tendency of the courts apparently is to find that the
operator is a servant or employee of the oil company rather than
an independent contractor. 2 This result is generally reached as
it was in the Sinclair case, and to a lesser degree in the Humble
case, by interpreting the contract in the light of the acts and con-
duct of the parties and concluding that the company in actual prac-
tice retained power to subject the operator and his employees to
its will and direction. But the defense is sometimes made that
even though the operator was the servant of the company, he had
no authority to employ servants for whose torts the company
would be liable. If such authority is not expressly given, it may
be implied from the nature of the work to be performed and from
the general course of conducting the business by the employee
for so long a time that knowledge and consent on the part of the
11 140 Tex. 468. 168 S. W. 2d. 632 (1943).
12 See annotation, 116 A.L.R. 457. 462 (1938).
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